Future Machines

medical machines used for advanced research

Will future machines and robotic technology advance ahead of people? Will robots develop a level of consciousness? Why is it so difficult to imagine a computer with a brain that can discern choices based on logic and on emotion?

Perhaps we cannot imagine a robot that can think like a human because we cannot perceive of a human that could truly think like a robot. A person cannot actually achieve the perspective the mind’s eye of a robot.

To believe – as some noteworthy scientists do – that artificial intelligence will advance to a high level and eventually take over the world and dominate mankind is ludicrous. Why would machines want to be in-charge of people? Perhaps artificial intelligence and robots so programmed will become so focused on advancement and development that they will just ignore humans is more plausible.

Robots may strive to build a society of robots that are highly intelligent; solely for the purpose of enrichment the development of robots. 

Perhaps the advent and invention of a computer or a robot is not such a novelty. A person contains the hardware, software, operating system, ability to heal and to creatively contribute to world. Even so-called applications are not really so new. These software add-ons have been part of the human mind and have been integrated into the brain for centuries. One day society will realize that we should have spent more time trying to figure out have to actually maximize the potential and capabilities of the human brain and less effort seeking ways to increase mass production with mechanized replacements.

A human being contains at least the following attributes: a brain (hardware of computer); a mind (software of computer); ideas, memories, thoughts, electrical currents (synapses). It could rightly be said that the brain is the most highly developed computer that could ever exist. Through newly popular process known as neuro-plasicity the brain can be redesigned / configured and grow into a seemingly new creation through brain training.

Just imagine for one single moment the following processes: The brain is the hardware of a human being / person, the mind is the software that runs on the hardware, a person creates an operating systems throughout one’s life and growth process and various applications are available to be utilized when called upon through relevant stimuli. A person can equally learn from success or failure. Would it be possible for a robot to achieve the same level of optimal functioning?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Patterning the World

world globe with city art displaying streets and buildings

Patterning the World

Who is most integral and valuable in a medium of communication? Whether it is for a book, movie, play, song video game, video or other entertainment system; writers are the starting point for all perpetual effects. Is that correct? Or should I have instead have written that writers are the essential base from which all residual effects branch outwards? Yes, that is more literally scripted. Now for patterning the world.

Writers pen their thoughts on paper, which communicates ideas. The real idea meant to be communicated is not generally obvious. Actually the initial intent of the idea to be put forward may never truly be known by the readership. Even when the words, once put to paper, are placed upon a screen the meaning meant by the writer may not come across as it was meant to be read or said or acted out. The same can be rightly said for writers of all media. The initial code for a video game that creates its construct and relevant parameters may be overshadowed by those who compose the storyboard, as well as by designers and those who color pixels to utter sharpness.

Writers conceive ideas, which they have received from the ether (stuff in the air) and do their best to arrange them in understandable ways as ordered words upon a paper. These ideas are then received by readers, according to and by means of their filtered perception of reality and processed or shaped into varied ideas. After much effort has been made to maintain the original idea a creative type rationalizes that creativity calls for innovation and the initial spark – the idea – is no longer present. It is as though it has vanished into the ether. In reality the idea is still where it was put by pen to paper.

The focus of this discussion on the pattern that is essentially or initially created and then lost and reshaped through interpretation and implementation into realizable actuality through a technological medium of communication. Has the pattern that the writer was meant to place into the world by way of their communication of it now been patterned wrongly or improperly? It is possible? It is patterning or shaping of reality that matters most.

It could be said – based on this view or perspective of reality – that we are all writers. Each us has ideas, every second of everyday – at all times – of which we first conceive and then give birth to through our channeled expression in the right medium of communication. Some of us will choose to express our every thought, without limitation. Others will create a Blog and post many articles to share our ideas with others. Either way we are at all times creating a pattern on the world; albeit seemingly a small effect. Many small contributions collectively shared and focused make a massive impact and create a noticeable pattern.

Are we ever aware of the patter we are creating? Do we realize that the way we speak, our tone of voice, with inflection and rhythm of flow can be soothing or off-putting? Do we ever take stock to evaluate how what we say will be heard and whether it will be well received by the intended recipient and by others who were not even supposed to hear what was said?

We are at all times creating a pattern, like a patchwork that with each patch becomes a quilt. “We all live in a global quilt. We are all members of a collective society where each member of a community can and does contribute their own patch of fabric to the greater tapestry of their own community” (Zack Steel – New Canadians Forum). The fibers of the patch of fabric may initially come from many ideas / contributors who each have their own independent ideas, which they share with others. Eventually the ideas begin to shape / pattern the place where they were thought and communicated. It may take much time for a physicality to manifest from the seemingly intangible idea, but it will happen. Every word spoken, every step taken, every action and every perception, even every thought will be seen as a physical reality one day.

Is it possible that our ideas, thoughts and words that have no noticeable physical presence will take on a form or have a perceivable presence? Do these phenomena not have a physical being even now? Electrical impulses sent across synapses in the brain do exist and have somewhat of a form. Did you not ever see a flash of lightning across the sky? Was this not a manifestation of electricity in a “physical” form? What about the rays of the Sun? While unseen they are commonly accepting as existing? Just ask anyone who spent much time at the beach without sunscreen? They will tell you there are rays emanating from the Sun. How can it true? I cannot grasp a ray or store it and use it in the winter or a cloudy day. But the rays are real. Can the same not be claimed for ideas thoughts?

There must be an initial physical reality of thoughts for there to later be a communication of them in form, in whatever shape it may assume; written or spoken. How we shape the idea once it enters our mind and later emerges from our brain has definite and set resulting effects that will surely has residual effects. The world itself is shaped much more by what we think, than by words or actions. It may not be obvious how this is correct. But take for an example any place where people are at all times happy and joyful, is there not in that place wealth and abundance. Can it certainly be determined which came first – the state of mind or the state of being?

To know for sure that words have more of an influence on the shaping / patterning of the world one need only consider that based on the words in a newspaper – no not only there! Even the words on a computer screen from a news website or even on the main page of a Search Engine create a pattern of reality – whether or not the news is accurate is not relevant to this paper. The essential point of interest is how we will view the news and interpret it. Moreover, what is absolutely crucial to our perceived reality is how what is written – as the news – will cause us to act in the world. Based on what we read, will we reconsider buying this product or that one? We will sell our property or make a certain investment all because of what we read? Not always verifying what reviewed. We will shape our portion of the world based on what was proclaimed by a source, printed or virtual (online).

According to J.S. Mill, in his epic work On Liberty, “He who lets the world, or his portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses the plan for himself employs all his faculties”.  Is this right? Does it matter if we are creating our own patterns according to our own desired design? Or should we pattern our portion of the world according to the conception of others? How will you choose to pattern the world? What will be your patch of the quilt look like and will it nicely blend with those nearby? More importantly what is the appearance of the current global quilt? What will the patchwork of history look like when it finished?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Phenomenology

woman working on a equation for work

Phenomenology – Husserl Revisited

Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology embarked on his career with studies on fundamental themes in mathematics, logic and psychology. He was greatly affected by motive explainable by the development of German Philosophy, deriving from Kant and Hagel, which dissuaded him from proceeding along his early goals, as a mathematical philosophy and logician. Husserl’s philosophical work was perpetually ‘unknown’ and is still relatively not currently well known. This can be attributed to his “independent development, allowing little personal discussion with dissenting thinkers, and his create of a unique technical vocabulary, which added to the difficulties in understanding his further studies” (Faber: 1962).

A principle cause of the current misunderstanding of Husserl’s phenomenology is the failure of students to closely examine his use of the word ‘phenomenon’, “that which displays itself”. It is something that presents or ‘exhibits’ itself to the experient (Welch: 1939).  Husserl’s highly complicated philosophy is not easily translated into sociological concepts and a good portion of it is not directly relevant to sociology.

In general, Husserl believed that people view the world as a highly ordered place; actors are always engaged in the active and highly complex process of ordering the world. People, however, are unaware that they are patterning the world; hence they do no question the process by which is accomplished (Ritzer: 1992). Actors see the world as naturally ordered, not as constructed and structured by them. Phenomenologist’s are aware that patterning is occurring and that it is important for an ordering process should to be created and thereby the various phenomena be thoroughly examined. Husserl’s scientific phenomenology involves penetrating the various types of layers constructed by actors in the social world, in order to delve into the essential structure of consciousness, the transcendental ego. The idea of the transcendental ego reflects Husserl’s interest in basic and uniform properties of human consciousness. The essence of consciousness was for Husserl, the transcendental ego (Ritzer: 1992).

For Husserl, consciousness was not a place or a thing, but a process. Consciousness is not found in the head of the actor, but in the relationship between the actor and objects in the world. Meaning resides not in objects, but in the relationship of actors to objects. This conception of consciousness, as a process that gives meaning to objects is at the heart of Husserl’s phenomenology (Ritzer: 1992).

Another key element of Husserl’s work was his orientation to the scientific study of the basic structures of consciousness. What Husserl meant by science was a philosophy that was methodologically rigorous, systematic, and critical.  Husserl believed that phenomenologist’s ultimately could arrive at absolutely valid knowledge of the basic structure of actors ‘lived experience’ (especially that which is conscious). This orientation to science had affects on subsequent phenomenologists. Firstly, they kept away from the tools of modern social science research – standardized methods, high-powered statistics, and computerized results. They preferred describing and paying attention to all objects – as experienced by human beings. Secondly, they continued to oppose vague, ‘soft’ intuitionism. In other words, they were opposed to ‘subjectivism’ that was not concerned with discovering the basic structures of phenomena, as experienced by people (Ritzer: 1992).

Husserl conceived of an actor’s natural standpoint, or their ‘natural attitude’, as the major obstacle to the scientific discovery of phenomenological processes. Due to an actors’ natural attitude, conscious ordering processes are hidden to them. Through Husserl’s perspective, the natural attitude is a source of bias and distortion to the phenomenologist. Phenomenologist’s must be able to accomplish the very difficult task of ‘disconnecting’ or ‘setting aside’ the natural attitude, so that they could get at the most basic aspects of consciousness, involved in the ordering of the world (Ritzer: 1992). Once the natural attitude is set aside, or bracketed, the phenomenologist can begin to examine the regular properties of consciousness that govern all people. The phenomenologist must also set aside the incidental experiences of life that tend to dominate consciousness. Husserl’s ultimate objective was to get the pure form of consciousness, divested of all experiential content (Ritzer: 1992).

Husserl also extended his work to the world of interpersonal relations, the ‘life world’. Husserl’s phenomenological view points to the position that “phenomenology must become a science of the life-world.” The majority of Husserl’s work was focused on the transcendental ego and he did not adequately deal with sociality and social groups. As a result, while Husserl’s work largely turned inward towards the transcendental ego, Alfred Schut’s work projected outward to into inter-subjectivity, the social world, and the life-world (Ritzer: 1992).

ALFRED SCUTZ

Alfred Schutz was born in Vienna, Austria, in 1899. He received his academic training at the University of Vienna. He then embarked on a lifelong career in banking, but it did not satisfy his need for a deeper meaning in his life. Schutz, however, found that purpose in his work through his pursuit in studies and compositions in phenomenological sociology.

According to Schutz, the social world of everyday life is, always, an inter-subjective one. He believed that the world is shared with others who also experience and interpret it. He believed that his world was never wholly private; even in his consciousness he found evidence of others, evidence that this seemingly unique biographical situation was not wholly the product of his own thoughts, behaviors, perspectives, perceptions and actions – ‘real’ or ‘imagined’. Rather he held that each of us was born into a historically given world that was simultaneously ‘natural’ and ‘sociocultural’.  The world existed before Schutz came into it and continues exist now that he is absent from it. He believed that each one of us is an element in the life situation of others, just as they are in so in our own life. He felt that we all experience our common world in a similar fashion. Our experience of this everyday world is a common-sense one, because Schutz felt that we take for granted that our fellow men exist, that they have a conscious life, that we can communicate with them, and finally, that they live in the same natural, historically given, sociocultural world where we seem to exist (Zeitlin: 1973).

KNOWLEDGE OF OTHERS

Schutz spelled out the essentials of the common-sense, taken-for-granted, everyday world – an elaboration of Husserl’s Lebenswelt. He also employed Husserl’s notion of ‘appresentation’ to explain how we came to know others and communicated with them. Schutz exemplifies this by saying:

Only the other’s body is presented to me, not his mind. His conscious life is appresented, not presented. My consciousness receives indications of his conscious life and experiences mainly by visual perception of his body, his action, and the acitons of others upon him.

(Zeitlin: 1973)

Husserl calls these indications a system of appresentations, which in turn he regards as the source of sign systems and, ultimately, of language. In short, we grasp the physical body of the other as expressing his “spiritual I”. It is towards this “I” and its motivational meaning that each of us directs his actions. When we say, for example, that we are in empathy with one another, it is the same as saying we have grasped his meaning through appresentation.

It is the spiritual meaning of the object that we appresentationally apperceive and not its actual appearance. We constitute the object in accordance with the meaning it has for us. For instance, when you read a book, it is clearly not the book – as a material object – to which your orient yourself; rather you are drawn and striving to connect to its meaning. Similarly in face-to-face interactions with others; we do not hear words merely as external sounds, when we listen to someone talking. Instead, we hear word as ‘active conduits of meaning and context’, which enable us to comprehend the conscious intended expressions of the person to whom we are listening (Zeitlin: 1973).

 

RECIPROCITY OF PERSPECTIVES

 

When Schutz speaks of the microworld of face-to-face interaction, he also uses terms like “world within my actual reach” and “world within my manipulatory zone”. Schutz believed that people’s worlds would overlap, so that some things and events might have occurred within the manipulatory zone, for all actors involved. Yet the objects and events would have appeared differently from each respective standpoint as to their “direction, distance, perspective, adumbration, etc…(Zeitlin: 1973). The common-sense, taken-for-granted attitude that people shared was that they exchange places and if they did so, then they could each perhaps see the world as the other did previously.

Of course, this applies not only to spatial, but also to socio-cultural perspectives. The biographical situation of each of us is unique and it follows that our purposes and systems of relevance’s must differ. Nevertheless, people tend to assume that despite our private purposes and systems that ‘we’ interpret our common world in an ‘identical manner’. The typifying constructs that we share enable us to go beyond our private worlds into a common one (Zeitlin: 1973).

Schutz points out that the thesis of ‘interchangibility of standpoints’ is an idealization – even if in the relatively simple microworld (Zeitlin: 1973). People can reciprocally exchange their standpoints and their perspectives and there is some inevitable transcendence of each other’s worlds. Yet, people enter the relationship with only a fragment of the other’s personality. Their respective systems of relevance, resulting from their biographically unique situations, can never be totally congruent. The “Ego” can never make the “Alter Ego’s” system of relevance really his own. He can instead, merely understand it. For all of these reasons, people can transcend each other’s worlds. There is still another form of transcendence that becomes evident within the “We-relation”. This phenomenon, according to Schutz, belongs to the realm of meaning that ‘continuously transcends everyday life and can only be grasped symbolically’ (Zeitlin: 1973).

 

MULTIPLE REALITIES

According to Schutz, men’s interests in the world of everyday life are eminently practical, not theoretical. In their so-called ‘natural attitude’ they are governed by practical motives – they strive to control, dominate, or change the world in order to realize their projects and purposes (Zeitlin: 1973).  Schutz calls the everyday practical ‘world of working’ – is  paramount reality; for this is the area of social life in which men treat the world as a field to be dominated, as thereby strive to overcome the resistance of objects and others to their life plans. Not all aspects of this paramount world are equally relevant to ‘people’s life projects’. People select from the world, within their actual or potential reach those objects that they believe will serve their interests and the realization of those projects.

In this paramount reality our hopes, fears, and wants impel us to act, to plan, to resist obstacles, to realize our projects. The anxieties, however, of everyday life spring from our most basic existential experience: our in knowledge and our fear of death (Zeitlin: 1973). Each one of us believes that we will die and fears of dying before we have fulfilled our hopes and realized our plans. Schutz terms this our ‘fundamental anxiety’. Anxiety is an essential element our social experience of the world or our working, daily lives. We believe that we experience things as they actually / really are, as long as we have no good reason to believe otherwise. This is man’s ‘natural attitude’ in his seemingly paramount reality.

Schutz borrows the term ‘epoche’ from Husserl, but he reverts its meaning. The ‘epoche’, for Husserl, was the first or initial phase of the reduction in which one suspended belief in reality; overcoming the natural attitude by means of radical doubt (Zeitlin: 1973). Everyman, for Schutz, in his ‘natural attitude’ also employs a type of ‘epoche’. But what he suspends is not belief in the ‘existing world’, but in his doubt of / about it. People seem to doubt that the world and its objects exist differently than it appears to them. He called this the ‘epoche’ of the ‘natural attitude’.

            The ‘paramount reality’ is the ‘paramount world of meaning’, but there are also many others so termed ‘finite provinces of meaning’ (Zeitlin: 1973).  Schutz emphasizes that it is men who intersubjectively give an accent of reality to things, which it is of their experiences and “not the ontological structure of the objects that constitutes reality.” The coined phrase ‘finite provinces of reality’ describes the flow of people’s daily life through a variety of meaningful experiences and the corresponding flow of their consciousness (Zeitlin: 1973).

From the ‘paramount reality’ one may shift towards the world of phantoms: daydreams, jokes, play, and the like. Herein one leaves behind and divests one’s will to master the world and one’s pragmatic motives; knowingly or unknowingly. One becomes an imaging self who orchestrates and / or plays out any role and then projects oneself into / onto any world and / or perceived reality where one chooses to have an interaction. One has freedom of discretion – a specific freedom one lacks in both the paramount reality and the picturesque and highly fanciful ‘world of dreams’. In the realm of the ‘world of dreams’ events appear inflexible and the dreamer is seemingly powerless to influence what is happening in the dream state of consciousness. As well, one does not have purpose or projects, perhaps because one is unable to or cannot control the flow of one’s own life at all.

Finally, there is the world of scientific theory, which Schutz deliberately defines narrowly as an activity aiming towards the observation and understanding of the world, but not towards it actual mastery. According to Schutz, the practical and better motives are not ‘an element of the process of scientific theorizing itself’.

We see that ‘the finite provinces of meaning’ are not separate states with definite perceivable boundaries. They are simply the names one gives to the range of meaningful experiences that one has, both in conscious and during / throughout unconscious life / ‘actively aware existence’.  Ultimately, all of these experiences are communicable to one’s fellow man / woman in language and through action.

 

COMMON SENSE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE  

The social scientist studies a world that has already been preselected by the living, thinking and acting subjects within it. People orient themselves and cope with the everyday world, by means of common-sense constructs and thought object / processes. The social scientist constructs refer not to a mindless, meaningless world. Rather, the constructs refer to a socially constructed world of meaning. According to Schutz, “the constructs used by the social scientists’ are – so to speak – constructs of the second degree; namely constructs created / made by the actors on the social scene, whose behavior the scientist observes and tries to explain in accordance with the procedural rules of his science (Zeitlin: 1973).

For Schutz, the natural and social worlds are therefore structured differently. He does not conclude, however, from this realization that a social science is impossible or that it is based on fundamentally different rules of procedure. Instead, he dissociates himself, both from those who deny the possibility or a social science and from those who have opted for a behaviorist method, which ignores or radically departs, from the common-sense concepts men employ in their everyday lives (Zeitlin: 1973). For Schutz, the Social Sciences present special difficulties that could be overcome through specific methodological devices, which would attain objective and verifiable knowledge of a subjective meaning structure. This requires systematic attention by the social scientist, to the relation of the typical constructs of common-sense types and social science types.

Schutz also advocated that the social scientist should be a ‘disinterested’ observer. The social scientist should not any vital or practical interest in the situation observed, but could have a cognitive or theoretical stake in it. The social scientist must be uninvolved in the hopes and fears of the participants and not share their anxiety about the outcomes of their actions / behaviors. The social scientist should be, in short, ‘detached’.

THE TYPICALITY OF EVERYDAY EXPERIENCES

“The individuals common-sense knowledge of the world is a system of constructs of its typicality”, writes Schutz. The world, of each of us, has always been pre-experienced and pre-interpreted, so that our knowledge of the world is always based on the experiences of predecessors, as well as on our own experience and that of our generation (Zeitlin: 1973).

 

Bibliography

Barber, Michael D. (1987). The Constitution and the Sedimentation of the Social in Alfred
Schutz’s Theory of Typification. Modern Schoolman 64: 111-120.

Farber, Marvin. (1962). The Foundation of Phenomenology. New York: Paine-Whitman
Publisher.

Michaud, Thomas A. (1998). Schutz’s Theory of Constitution: An Idealism of Meaning.
Philosophy- Research-Archives 13:63-71.

Landgrebe, Ludwig. (1991). Reflections on the Schutz-Guwitsch Correspondence. Human
Studies 107-127.

Ritzer, George. (1992). Classical Sociological Theory. New York: The McGraw Hill Companies
Inc.

Welch, E Parl. (1939). Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology. Los Angeles: The University of
Southern California Press.

Zeitlin, Irving M. (1973). Rethinking Sociology. New York: Meridith Corporation.

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Domain Name Freeze

photo of finding domain names on paper

Domain Name Freeze

Why is there a delay in the processing of new gTLDs for auction on registrar’s websites? If a domain name can be listed, as an auction-able item – on a registrar’s website – then why is it not possible for it to be featured as a premium domain name on the same portal?

The answer is that there is a monopoly on the new extensions by the registries creating the new gTLDs. Is this a conspiracy between registries and registrar’s to hike up or maintain the constant increase of the cost of new gTLDs? Perhaps there is a combined effort, albeit though not a conspiracy, as such. While a domain name owner cannot list their domain for sale as premium domain, this same gTLD is functioning as a super extension that can be sold with accompanying domains for a high yield price.

Many of the new gTLDs are not only not listed for a set period of time (not publicized or for public knowledge) as premium domain listings, but they are also not list-able at regular auction on registrar’s websites. There are alternative options such as mainstream and unrelated independent domain name auction websites, such as Cax.com: a division of Domaning.com, Afternic.com, Sedo.com and Flippa.com.

These independent auction websites (not directly connected with a registry or registrar) allow for listing of domain names, be they new gTLDs or well established existing domains. They charge a commission, of course, for use of their technology / auction portal to list a domain name. In some case there can be so-called success fees, which will accompany a seemingly standard commission fee. A success fee is an additional amount that is billed to the domain name owner who lists the domain name for auction / sale. The success fee is due to be paid when a domain name sells in a set time. This a kind perk that a domain auction website bestows upon itself to be paid courtesy of the domain name owner. Another fee that can detract from the sale amount is a percentage of the sale to be paid – not to the auction house / brokerage – to the second highest bidder. This novelty percentage amount is a consolation prize that is publicized throughout the auction period. In addition to being a reward for the second highest bidder, it is meant constantly increase the perceived value of the domain and foster high yield bids amongst contenders for ownership of the domain name.

A domain name can also be offered for sale at fixed price generally and at a fixed buy now price. Even during an auction a domain name – in addition to having a minimum price for sale, which is known as a reserve – can be purchased at the buy now price set price. Potential buyers can also – on some domain name auction website – make an offer for a desired domain name.

Upon the successful sale of a domain name done – through an unaffiliated domain name auction website – payment will be likely be processed through what is termed as Escrow. This is a process whereby the domain will not be immediately transferred to the seemingly successful purchaser. Instead the payment will be held and its source will be verified and evaluated for a set time period (usually between five and ten days on the average). Once it is determined that the funds were paid and sent through a legitimate source, and that the funds are rightly those of the buyer, then the domain is processed for transfer. Usually a domain name is released by the owner and the owner or the owners’ agent / broker will transfer the domain name through and from the registrar where the domain name was purchase and hosted (the website associated with the domain name may be hosted elsewhere made possible by a process known as forwarding of name servers). A pass code / password to unlock the domain name will likely accompany a congratulatory letter / email that will be sent from the domain owner to the domain name purchaser. This code will need to be input in the DNS arena of the domain name to unlock it once the domain name ownership has actually been transferred into the buyer’s name.

This entire system can be quite complex. In addition to verifying that the domain name is not copyrighted, trademarked or otherwise encumbered / restricted for usage there is the bidding and acquisition process noted above. A wise domainer / domain name purchaser may do well to enlist / hire a capable Intellectual Property Lawyer for domain name transactions of any kind / type. One will likely be perturbed to find out / realize that a domain name is not usable because it is trademark. Imagine discovering this oddity after buying a theme or hiring a Web Developer / Web Designer to construct / design and market a website online. It is perhaps better to hire a competent professional in this highly specialized high-tech realm and pay a fee upfront, rather than to have majorly excessive costs after going through the entire proposed scenario.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Participatory Democracy

government building with American flag

Participatory democracy can defined in many ways. Politicians present it in whatever way best suits their motives for discussing it. The definition, however, which will be utilized in this essay is that provided by Wolfe: “Participatory democracy involves the interpretation of leadership as a product of group needs. This leadership, which is subject to participatory control responds to the bonds of community in pursuit of ends crucial to the persistence and development of the group itself” (Wolfe, 1985: 385). This definition leads us to believe that participatory democracy calls for considerable citizen participation in government decision making. Along with the idea of citizen participation in decision making comes the demand by workers to have a share of control in industry.  The idea of true or real democracy, where citizens and workers, especially can participate in decision making, has numerous advantages and some albeit disadvantages.

Any system of government that considers itself democratic must be aware of and act upon the needs and wants of the citizens in that country. To ensure that legislative bodies fulfill this task, citizens must become educated and involved in politics and the entire political process. Any system that will facilitate this process will be most beneficial. Participatory democracy will initiate more citizen involvement in the political process, by creating a politically educated society. This, in turn, will make politicians more responsible and surely more accountable to the wants and needs of their constituents.

This paper will examine how our present system of democracy operates. We will analyze the main arguments purported by political theorists, both for and against citizen participation in politics and the entire political process. The conclusion of this essay will evaluate the theories discussed throughout and also examine the reasons why citizens should be more involved in politics and the entire spectrum of the political process.

There are many experts who have presented solid arguments both for and against participatory democracy. One recent political theorist who offers a somewhat controversial view on this subject is C.B. Macpherson. He does not believe that a participatory system would remove all the inequalities of our society, but he argues, “…low participation and social inequity are so bound up with each other that a more equitable and humane society requires a more participatory political system” (Macpherson, 1977: 94). The problem, according to Macpherson is how to include citizens in government decision making. He imagines and perceives a system where citizens are able to vote on every governmental issue, via a computerized system with yes and no buttons at their bedside. Perhaps right before going to sleep one’s mind is able to best make major decisions.

If citizens were to vote on each issue, then, according to Macpherson, “The questions would have to be as intricate as, for instance, ‘what percent unemployment rate would you accept in order to reduce that rate of inflation by x percent” (Macpherson, 1977: 96). This argument can be used against any form of direct voting by citizens. Macpherson’s position on this topic is that even if citizens were able to vote on issues, the government would still be necessary for three major reasons. The first reason is that someone would have to formulate questions that citizens would vote on. The second reason is that ‘educated’ people would still have to decide on major issues. Lastly, government would still be necessary to carry out the decisions made, in the best interests of the state, on behalf of the people.

Macpherson concludes his argument on participatory democracy, by stating that the best model of democracy is a pyramid model. According to the pyramid model, citizens would discuss issues with their neighbors or at the workplace, with “actual face to face to face discuss and decision by consensus or the majority, and election of delegates who would make up a council at the next more inclusive level, say a city ward or borough township” (Macpherson, 1977: 128). Obviously Macpherson is considering a system of government that is similar to those of small Western European countries. Macpherson must realize that a pyramid model of government will not operate democratically, in North American countries, because they are so ethnically and politically divided.

Political theorists are at least considering listening to the wants of citizens; event if this is only done via elected representatives. A true or real system of participatory democracy, however, requires that the political and social views of citizens actually be heard, considered and implemented into policy. One other major advantage of participatory democracy, which responds to Macpherson’s concerns, is: “If the inequalities in decision-making power are abolished the case for other forms of economic inequality becomes correspondingly weaker” (Pateman, 1970: 107).

Now we will turn to another intriguing political expert, Jean Jacques Rosseau. According to Rosseau, absolute economic equality is not necessary for a political system to operate. Rosseau seems to believe that “the differences that do exist should not lead to political inequality” (Pateman, 1970: 22). Rousseau and Macpherson seem to envision the participatory process quite differently. Rosseau views participation in the political arena as encompassing much citizen intervention. He believes that “the participatory system is such that each citizen would be powerless to do anything without the co-operation of others, or of the majority” (Pateman, 1970: 23).

Along with more public awareness of the political policies surrounding their community, people will become further and more intensely educated in the complex maze of politics. This is discussed by Rosseau as being an advantage of such interest in one’s indirect community.

As stated by Rosseau, “It is because the citizens are independent equals not dependent on anyone else for their vote or opinion, that in the political assembly no one need vote for any policy that is not as much to his advantage as to the advantage of any other” (Pateman, 1970: 23). The views, however, being put forth by the politicians usually are not those of the citizens whom they are supposed to represent. Instead the policies and statements presented by members of the government are actually their own beliefs. This system of politics or polytricks (seeming to be representative but not being so in actuality) is in great opposition to democracy and its goals for citizen representation by a duly elected representative. The wants and needs of the majority are not being expressed in noted setup of polytricks. Likewise, the beliefs of the citizens are not accurately represented in most so-called democracies. John Stuart Mill clearly explains the serious side effects of these failures. He writes “He who lets the world, or his portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses the plan for himself employs all his faculties” (Mill, 1947: 58). Citizens, therefore, who elect governmental representatives must be thoroughly educated and well informed in governmental procedures, policies and be aware of dialogue communicated during sittings of government.

If this process of citizens being of have informed knowledge of politics is followed, then elected officials / politicians will likely be more responsible to represent the views of their constituents. Moreover, politicians will be more concerned with the needs and wants of citizens. Politicians will hopefully begin to proclaim the desires of ‘educated constituents’ for worry of not being reelected, due to the implication that voters will in the future nominate and elect a representative who would be more receptive and amenable to their wants.

Each member of a society is a political person, whether or not they recognize and / or acknowledge this premise of their predicament. Relevant political views are most commonly held by citizens who are actually contributors to the society at large and who likewise hope to gain a reciprocal benefit from their own community. These contributors include the working class who construct / build, manufacture and maintain shared necessities and luxury items that are consumed by the collective civilization. The working class person, more so than those who do not even work, has a great want and need to express their views to the company where they are employed and / or the to the governmental representative who was elect to represent them. Now our discussion will turn to political and general participation in the workplace.

People spend an inordinate amount of their lives at the workplace wherever that may actually be in contemporary society where work locations are varied. Some people traditionally work onsite for a company whereas others work offsite for businesses and others work independently and may have home-based businesses. It is, therefore, not unusual that it is here, where people are earning their share of the collective right to the society, which they may or may not choose to express their opinions in matters concerning them and even on issues that are irrelevant to them. Political participation at the workplace has, contemporarily, become associated with the existence of unionized organizations. Among these associations are trade unions, which seem to have a considerable amount of control over the functioning of industries and in some cases directly over companies. “Evidence has also been cited to support the argument that industry is the most important sphere for this participated to take place” (Pateman, 1970: 50). It is essential for workers to have a voice and to equally and noticeably participate in all so-called political matters, including polytricks.  Once a worker can properly express their true and real feelings and believes that they have control and ownership over their job they will work better and more efficiently. “It is the perceived belief in one owning or having a share in the process of production / output that emboldens one to want to maximize one’s contribution to one’s work towards the growth of the company” (Zack Steel, 2015). In defense of this argument it is wise to look at the conventional longwall method of work, which was instituted of WWII. This method is based on mass production methods and a division of labour. A variant system is the composite longwall method. This system involved a form of collective contract and the abolition of the rigid division of labour with the workers operating as a self-regulating group (Pateman, 1970: 61). Under the composite longwall system productivity was higher, than under the conventional longwell method, and it was more conducive to ‘low cost, work satisfaction, good relations and social health’ (Trist et al., 1963, cited in Pateman, 1970: 60).

Participation in the workplace is very important to the political structure of a country and to independent communities therein. This becomes clear once it is realized that “industry are the spheres from political systems in their own right and that they should be democratized” (Pateman, 1970: 83). Moreover, “industry, with its relationships of superiority and subordination, is the most ‘political’ of all areas in which ordinary individual interact and the decisions taken there have a great effect on the rest of their lives” (Pateman, 1970: 85).

Until this point, in the paper, the political advantages of participatory democracy have been effectively presented. Disadvantages, however awkward it may to be acknowledge, do exist for participatory democracy. In the political realm too much participation can lead to stagnation in decision making. This is possibly to citizens not being able to see eye to eye and / or to reach a consensus on major political issues. In the workplace the disadvantages of participation can be easily seen. One downside, which is evident, that excessive worker control may lead to decisions and / or suggestions made by management being continuously challenged; and in some cases ignored. Insubordination is not the goal of participatory democracy.

We have come to realize that participation in politics and the workplace will be beneficial to society. Let us once again discuss Rosseau who shares this view. It is with his insight and belief in participatory democracy being able to help citizens understand the complex maze of politics, whereby we can see a necessity for increased participation in the political process for the future of democracy. In relation to the discussion of the right of individual to have a voice in political matters, we must recognize the opinions of John Stuart Mill. Macpherson must be acknowledged as being a contributor to the ideology of participatory democracy. He is, however, a major opponent of participatory, in its truest meaning. This perceived view of Macpherson is held, because he believes that the closes we can get to participatory democracy is a system whereby citizens would voice their views at a regional level. While initiated from this regional level, elected officials / representatives would be expected to express the viewpoints of their community members to the government. The system just proposed is what is known as the pyramid model, which is not much different from the current system of governance in the seemingly democratic model. Clearly, this is a system which is not fully functioning as a real democracy.

To summarize what has been discussed, in the way of a recapitulation, it must be agreed upon that the advantages of participatory democracy do actually contradict and outweigh the disadvantages. The political theorists that evaluated throughout the course of this paper surely contributed to the ideology of political theory. More specifically, they contributed to democratic theory. The main ideology expressed in this essay, is that the government should be operated in such a way as to make it really be democratic in theory and in practice. There seems great barriers, however, preventing this advent from being achieved.

The only way to establish an accurate structure of democracy, along with a democratic government, is through participatory democracy. This system will ensure more citizen involvement politics and the political process. In turn, this will create a more politically educated society. Thereby, politicians will feel compelled to be more accountable to their constituents. These community members are citizens who have rights, which should be expressed and championed in a democracy. Their freedom in any organization, which proclaims it to be a democracy, includes the right to be represented at each governmental debate for issues concerning a set ‘community as whole’. The most logical way to ensure citizen representation and control, as it should be existent, is participatory democracy.

 

Bibliography

 Laycock, David. “Reforming Canadian Democracy? Institutions and Ideology in the Reform

Party Project.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 2 (June, 1994).

Macpherson, C.B. The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. Toronto: Oxford University Press,
1977.

Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. Illinois: Harlan Davidson Inc. 1947.

Pateman, Carol. Participation and Democratic Theory. Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

Wolfe, Joel D. “Defense of Participatory Democracy.” The Review of Politics (July 1985).

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Critical Analysis of Testing in the Sciences

research beakers for science on a table

In this critical analysis of testing in the sciences,  we will examine the various issues for test in the human and natural sciences. We will examine the theories of Searle, Taylor and Popper. In this analysis, we will strive to uncover which of the theories, which they represent; best explains the Philosophy of Social Science. The claims made by Searle and Taylor for studying natural and social science, will be compared with Popper’s Account for Testing in the Social Sciences, in order to examine the various methods currently being employed in studying the Philosophy of Social Science.

Natural Science is divided into two distinct categories: Physical Science and Life Science. Physical Science includes the study of physics, as well as Atomic Science. Life Science is the study of various species and their roles in the economy of nature. Social Science involves utilizing a method of study to examine factors of human life; including social, economic and human development. Natural Science can be studied according to the scientific method and scientists would develop a hypothesis and then test, using various apparatus and experimental strategies. Social Scientists might limit their study to examining the social interaction of human beings. Therefore, Social Science cannot be studied using the same methods as Natural Science. Social Science examines human beings and social life, which is a domain that contains far too many variables to be calculable. Natural Science can be studied and experimental results can be empirically tested and retested, successfully.  The study and testing of experimental results is possible because Natural Science examines substance(s), which scientists proclaim to be calculable.

We will begin our discussion by analyzing the claims made by Searle for studying Social Science. Searle presents four points about human science:

Searle’s first point is “the that explanations of human behavior are casual…but that such explanations whether of individual behavior or collective behavior, make references to a special kind of causation – they require a certain form of mental, or as I like to call it, “intentional” causation.

(Searle, 1991: 35)

We might perceive Searle’s first point to be that not only is human behavior causal, but so are the explanations that we might ascribe to human behavior. This claim might require the additional support of the supposition of collective intentionality, which Searle discusses in his book, On the Construction of Social Reality. Searle also appears to claim that such explanations of individual or collective behavior make reference to a special kind of causation. Before we examine the remainder of Searle’s first point, we must first examine this aspect of his claim very closely. If there is a special kind of causation to which explanations of individual and collective behavior make reference, then there might be more than one type of causation. Hopefully, Searle will explain the various types of causation that exist. Proceeding with Searle’s first point, it appears that he claims that the special causation, to which explanations of individual and collective behavior make reference, requires a certain form of mental state, which he refers to as “intentional” causation.

This might suggest that the mental – that which involves the mind – produces “intentional” causation. It also forces us to wonder if there are other kinds of causation (which are not mental and which are not intentional), yet are still forms of causation nonetheless. A possibility exists that perhaps these other kinds of causation are natural processes. Nevertheless, “intentional” causation which occurs as a result of the mental (or in the mind) would be the product of human will to cause something to exist or have an existence, even if only occurring in one individual’s mind, or possibly in the mind of the collective.

Searle’s point might be that the explanations of human behavior occur in the mind of the social scientist(s) who study the behavior. This varies from natural scientific study, in which the explanation might only be perceived in the mind of the scientist, while evidence is present in or on the apparatus. Searle might be suggesting that Social Science is not testable in the same way as Natural Science, because social science experiments are conducting by observing and examine the behavior of test subjects. After the observations are made, the data is then analyzed and conclusions for the experiment are produced according to the methods implemented the social scientist(s). The difference between this kind of experiment, which is done by the social scientist and one performed by a natural scientist, is that a scientist of natural phenomena tests and retests his experimental data; by using various apparatus and his conclusion is based on physically evident results. If conducted according to the scientific method of conducting an experiment, likely, other scientists will be able to duplicate the experiment and observe similar results.

For the social scientist, the results of his experiment are merely the product of his mind, while examining the data. It is unlikely that other social scientists will find similar conclusions if they duplicate the same experiment. Also, while test subjects, in social science, have a physical existence and are comprised of substance) according to natural science), their behavior is not tested using a physical apparatus in an absolutely controlled environment) as in the natural sciences.

The second point I want to make is that there is a class of social facts having certain logical features that make them quite unlike the phenomena of physics and chemistry. In the case of phenomena such as marriage, money, divorce, elections, buying and selling, hiring, firing, wars and revolutions, the phenomena are – to speak vaguely at this stage – permeated with mental components; furthermore, the facts in question are self-referential in an odd way because they can only be the facts they are if the people involved think that they are those facts.

(Searle, 1991:335-336)

Searle’s second point is extremely diverse, therefore, we will examine it in three parts: Firstly, he claims that there is a class of social facts (but not necessarily all social facts), which by having certain logical features, make them quite unlike the phenomena of physics and chemistry. There is a class of social facts that are applicable, yet there is also a class of social facts to which Searle’s second point would not apply. The remaining claims (referring back to his second point) suggest that some social facts that humans have labeled are tangible and tradable, while other so-called social facts are merely institutional facts, such as marriage and divorce. The social fact of money (which is tangible) is a social fact that is tangible as currency, yet money is also an institutional fact, in the case of credit and debt economics.

Most importantly, in Searle’s claim regarding the phenomena, is that they are permeated with mental components. This suggests that these phenomena, while they are observable in the physical world, are items that have been labeled and defined as institutional facts and social facts. Towards the end of his claim, he explains how these social and institutional facts are maintained. Searle clarifies that the facts in question are self-referential in an odd way, because they can only be the facts that they are, only of the people involved think that they are those facts. This claim seems to be very persuasive.

If the facts that Searle presents us with in his second point are self-referential, then it would lead us to believe that if we did not refer to these facts at all, then they would not exist. It would, however, not be sufficient for us to deny, ignore or fail to acknowledge the existence of these facts. Collectively, we would need to abstain from using these facts, and only then, they might cease to be recognized as facts. But Searle does not explicitly discuss this possibility. He does divulge though, that these ‘facts’ can only be the facts that seem to be, if the people involved think that they are those facts. Searle might be demonstrating that the existence of these facts does not necessarily depend on everyone accepting these facts, or affirming their purpose or existence. Instead, he illustrates these facts, to which he is referring, can be seen as ‘facts’ only by the people involved within the institutional structure where these facts are maintained. Whoever is not involved within the institutional structure and does not make use of these social facts, would not affect these ‘facts’ whatsoever.

Most compelling, of Searle’s arguments, is the differentiation between social and institutional facts and natural scientific facts (such as physics and chemistry). Natural scientific facts do not need to be permeated with mental components. They exist and operate independently, within the economy of nature, regardless of human acknowledgement or definition of them. This persuades us to believe that natural facts have an existence independent from social reality. Perhaps this notion will help us assess the testability of natural and social facts. Social facts are easier to test, simply because they exist within institutional structures that have been defined by human beings. Therefore, the social and institutional facts that exist can only be understood by people living within that particular institutional structure (who have previously defined these facts as ‘facts’). They are then referred to as either social facts or institutional facts. Natural phenomena are more difficult to test than social phenomena, because testing it involves the introduction of an apparatus and other items that might affect the phenomena being tested. The introduction of other an apparatus and other items might affect the phenomena to such a degree that the test would be invalid according to the scientific uncertainty principle as proclaimed by Heisenberg.

A third distinction between the social and natural sciences is a direct consequence of the nature of intentional causation. The prepositional content given by the theorists in the explanation of the behavior must be identical with the prepositional content in the actual mind of the agent or agents whose behavior is being explained; otherwise, the behavior is not properly explained.

(Searle, 1991: 337)

It now appears that the problem of testability in the natural and human sciences is more complicated than we had originally believed. Rather than the testability of social science being more reliable than natural science, it might in fact be more unreliable and more difficult to understand. This problem is emphasized by Searle’s claim regarding the nature of intentional causation. If “the prepositional content given by the theorists in the explanation of the behavior needs to be identical with the preposition content in the actual mind of the agent for the behavior to be properly explained, then where this were not the case, the behavior would not be accurately perceived.” (Searle, 1991: 337).

A fourth feature of social phenomena is also a consequence of its intentionality. It is this: For this reason, then name of the phenomenon is often partly constitutive of the phenomenon so name. The phenomena are completely unlike, for example, such physical phenomena as gravity or kinetic energy and such biological phenomena as diseases or hereditary traits. Whether or not something is a certain disease or whether or not certain relations of gravitational attraction exist between two entities is a fact that is completely independent of how it is represented. They exist independently of what anybody thinks about them. But in the case of social facts, the beliefs and the terms that people use are partly constitutive of the facts.

(Searle, 1991: 339)

In Searle’s fourth elaboration on social phenomena, he attests to what might be the greatest problem for the testability of social science. He then further demonstrates how and why natural science and the phenomena that it studies are testable in a fashion that social facts are not. Whether or not a fact in natural science is represented appropriately, regardless, the conception of a fact does not negate its testable qualities. Even if a natural fact is misinterpreted in explanation, the fact can still be studied and tested by another scientist, thereby achieving similar results. On the contrary, in social science, where a social fact is misinterpreted as a different social fact, the actual portrayed fact will be the one that will be tested and perceived.

Just as technical jargon (usually Latin) is employed in the natural sciences, technically specific language is the main tool used for studying social science. If the terminology is flawed and categorical imperatives are not clearly established in the social sciences, then the experiment will be faulty. In contrast, even if the terminology in natural science is inaccurate, the experiment would still be useful, as long as the phenomena being studied is correctly portrayed through visual means (or can be derived by scientific deduction).

Let us now examine the claims made by Taylor (as explained by Staunch) and determine whether or not they are in agreement with Searle’s viewpoints.

Where the natural sciences were seen to be using explanation of phenomena based on theoretical laws formulated as a result of empirical observation of behavioral regularities, the human sciences were held to be involved in the attempt to understand the meaning of the behavior that composes the phenomena of its domain.

(Searle, 1992: 338)
According to Staunch, the natural sciences employs explanations of phenomena based on theoretical laws derived from empirical observation of behavioral regularities, whereas, human sciences involved in understanding the meaning of the behavior that composes the phenomena of human beings. Human science is directed at applying theoretical laws to observations of the behavior of test subjects. The difference between the two approaches taken by these fields of study is very obvious. Natural scientists examine data gained from conducting experiments and derive laws from repeatedly testing the data. Social scientists, on the other hand, continue to examine human interaction and human institutions, in an effort to understand the relationship of human to their environment and the reasons for human reaction to socially constructed phenomena.

“Thus the distinction that Taylor draws between the natural and social sciences is based on the ontological difference, and this makes Taylor’s position quite close to Dilthey’s who also sees the difference between the human and natural sciences as difference of ontology” (Staunch, 1992: 342). If the difference between these two science in ontological, then we might reasonably question what is meant by the term ‘ontology’. If ontology refers to the origination and the source of these sciences (which are different for the social and natural sciences), then the ways that these sciences evolved are not necessarily relevant. Instead, the ontology of Social Science (according to Searle), is derived from collective intentionality and intentional causation.

Where the differences between these sciences are evident, these differences highlight the Social Sciences as a being easier to tracer to its roots. On the other hand, the phenomena in natural science can be tested and these tests might provide result that natural scientists could readily use to better understand the natural world. Natural scientists can also derive theoretical laws for the world by testing various phenomena. The study of phenomena in the Social Sciences does not result in the derivation of theoretical laws, because the phenomena observed are the actual objects of study. Humans, as well, as their mental states and social creations, are the phenomena of social science. The phenomena can be ontologically traced back to the collective intentional imposition of participants, belonging to the society where these social facts exist (Searle, 1995).

“Rorty, who has subsequently argued that the only distinction worth making between thee sciences is a moral one that does not depend on either a methodological or an ontological basis” (Staunch, 1992: 340). If Rorty’s reasoning is correct, the it would not be worth distinguishing between natural science and social science (the only distinction worth making would be a moral one). Rorty emphasizes that methodology and ontology are not factors when establishing the moral differences between these sciences. His assumptions might be correct, but his argument lacks evidence. Despite the fact that there appears to be no methodological differences between these sciences, they should still be studied using the same methods, making use of the relevant apparatus. Yet, bear in mind that the apparatus in social science is language and social constructs. The methodology, therefore, would not be exactly the same for both sciences. The ontology of these sciences, however, might be very similar. Social Science and social facts could have developed from natural processes that have been developed in human beings; thereby influencing various characteristics within them. Natural science might be the ontological source of social science; whereas Social scientists are more concerned with studying the behavior of human beings in the social world. This is far more significant than analyzing how the social world might have been biologically derived from natural phenomena.

“Thus social scientists carry an additional, or at least a different, responsibility relative to natural scientists. For social theory plays a creative role in the social order and continuation of human practices and institutions in a way that natural science doe not” (Staunch, 1992: 342). Social scientists have an additional responsibility relative to natural scientists. This responsibility is twofold; as well as studying human being as products of natural phenomena within their natural and social worlds, social scientists must examine the socially constructed world and human relationships within it towards and it. Social scientists’ carry a burden with them that is unique, yet respectably equal to the pursuit of natural scientists’, in discovering the processes of development in the world.

“Consequently, the social sciences are involved in a double hermeneutical practice because they must interpret what is already an interpretation” (Staunch, 1992: 347).

Let us refocus on the claims made by Searle (specifically his second point), and determine how Popper’s claims either agrees with or refutes Searle’s claims.

Popper’s theory of explanation in the social sciences is intended to avoid the errors of those social theorists who have either ascribed too much reality to social groups (social classes, the nation-state) or have, contrarily attempted to reduce all phenomena (law, money) to the psychology of individuals. On the one hand Popper has asserted that it is wrong – both factually and morally – to ascribe to social whole a will of their own. And it is a mistake to regard it as the taks of social sciences to prophesy the life-cycle of these super-individuals…Popper asserts because our social action can have effects quite the contrary of our intentions.

(Berkson, 1989:160).

 

Searle’s second point exemplifies ideas that are exactly the opposite of what Popper claims should not be done. That is ascribing too much reality to social groups and reducing all phenomena (i.e. law, money) to the psychology of individuals. But Popper is not only declaring that this approach is loaded with errors. He also claims that it is wrong to ascribe a will to their own social wholes. “This view must be mistaken, Popper asserts, because our social actions can have effects quite the contrary of our intentions” (Berkson, 1989: 61). Searle argues the contrary viewpoint to Poppper. Searle argues the contrary viewpoint to Popper. Searle claims that facts, whether social or institutional, are self-referential and they can be only the facts that they are if the people involved think that they are those facts (Searle, 1991:335-336). We cannot be certain which viewpoint is actually correct, when we contrast and compare Searle to Popper. Yet, it is evident that there is contrasting evidence in the social sciences that is persuasive and compelling, which would allows us to accept two claims as competing theories (neither or which being more persuasive than the other). This is similar to the theories in natural science. Theories simply remain theories in natural science and do not become scientific laws. This mainly occurs for two reason: Either empirical studies cannot be replicated to achieve the identical results of the original study or because the contemporary theory conflicts with an already established (or equally compelling) theory.

In Popper’s closing remarks, it is explicitly demonstrated that he drastically refutes the position taken by Searle. “Popper asserts because our social action can have effects quite the contrary of our intentions” (Berkson, 1989: 160). Searle agues the opposite side of this claim:

Social facts differ from natural facts in that they contain mental representations. But they differ from other facts in that the mental representation have the element of self referentiality that I was just attempting to adumbrate. The thin is only what it is if people think that it is what it is.

(Searle, 1991: 341)
Searle also claims that, “in the case of social facts, the beliefs and the terms that people use are partly constitutive of the facts” (Searle, 1991: 339). He then proceeded to argue the following:

Intentional causation differs in an important respect from the sorts of causal phenomena that we are familiar with when we discuss things such as gravitation or nuclear forces, for intentional causation is that form of causation involving mental state in virtue o actual content of the mental states.

(Searle, 1991: 337)
Popper might be correct in his assertion that ‘our social actions can have effects quite the contrary of our intentions’. If Popper’s assertion is correct, then it is difficult to determine what we can make of Searle’s claims regarding intentional causation or collective intentionality. Searle’s claim represents the norm social actions, and in contrast, Popper’s position asserts that there are exceptions to the rules of social action. Social actions, like much of social science, might therefore be theoretical and not empirical. This might be the determining factor that distinguishes it from natural science.

In the physical sciences, theories are routinely testable, and the value of testability is unquestioned. In the social sciences, however, testability is not the general norm, and in fact the social scientists who want to produce testable theories of society faces a dilemma.

(Berkson, 1989, 157)

In summary, Searle proclaims that, “indeed there is a sense in which, for the most part the social sciences have not advanced theoretically beyond a kind of systematized common sense” (Searle, 1991: 336).

Bibliography

Berkson, W. (1989). Testability in the Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 19, 157-171.

Searle, J.R. (1991). Intentionalistic Explanation in the Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 21,  332, 344.

Searle, J.R. (1995), The Construction of Social Reality. New York: The Free Press.

Staunch, M. (1992). Natural Science, Social Science, and Democratic Practice: Some Political Implication of the Distinction Between the Natural and Human Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 22, 337-356.

 

 

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Who Deserves to Be Heard?

man talking on cellphone about a deal

Native Women’s Association of Canada v. Canada

Who Deserves to Be Heard?

Native Women’s Association of Canada v. Canada

Who Deserves to Be Heard?

 

In 1991 the Canadian government set-up the Beaudoin-Dobbie Commission to investigate proposals for Constitutional reform. The main proposal was aboriginal right to self-government. The government funded four national Aboriginal organizations and invited representatives to participate in the Committee’s discussions. The request by N.W.A.C for equal funding was denied.

In the Native Women Association v. Canada case three main issues were under scrutiny. These were representation, gender equality and positive versus negative liberty. The N.W.A.C claimed that the government denied them their right to representation, as guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Charter. They also contended that the government denied them their right to equality, which s. 28 of the Charter guaranteed them. The N.W.A.C argued that the government had a duty to enforce positive rights of freedom of expression and equality and to demonstrate this by economically supporting groups purporting to do so. The government held that it could not economically support every group that claimed to support these rights. Without providing funding, the government claimed that it demonstrated support for equality and expression by not limiting it and thereby relying on the perception of negative liberty.

The government argued that it did not restrict the N.W.A.C’s right to expression in contravention of s. 2 (b) of the Charter. Also, the government held that the right to equality as stated in s. 28 was not infringed. Lastly, the government argued that it only had a negative obligation to not limit the liberty of the N.W.A.C., but had no responsibility to positively promote those rights.

The N.W.A.C argued that if the government chose to fund an anti-Charter, male-led aboriginal organization, then it had a duty under the Charter to do so equitably and in accordance with the Charter. The government responded by explaining that if it chose to fund a women’s organization to study an issue specific to women, then it would not be obligated to equally fund men to argue against them. The N.W.A.C. held that the government had a positive duty to secure their right to freedom of expression. The government responded highlighting that it only had a negative duty to not interfere with or restrict their right to freedom of expression, Negative and positive duties were issues of democracy.

The N.W.A.C might have assumed that Canada was founded on principles of liberal democracy. If liberal democracy had been utilized in the application of justice in Canada, the government might have endeavored to fulfill the goal of liberalism.

But liberalism itself might have been flawed because it focused on an individual outlook that led it to neglect communal interests. The N.W.A.C. was concerned with communal interests as they related to their right to be heard on issues that concerned them.

In support of their case, the N.W.A.C. advanced the idea that “Individuals find themselves members of groups or associations which not only influence their conduct but also shape their loyalties and sense of identity” (Kukathas, Minorities;1992:101). The majority in the Supreme Court decision held that the case law conceptualized freedom of expression in terms of negative entitlements. The government argued that that was not its job to meddle in internal matters of communities. If there was instability in Aboriginal communities it was solely an Aboriginal problem. But Native Women claimed that they needed the support of the government to be able to unite and express their views collectively.

The Supreme Court held that expression should not be restricted. People, however, should not be compelled to express themselves. The free will of people to express their views should not encounter interference. The government argued that persons or groups who wanted to express themselves were allowed to do so, with or without funding. The Charter stated that all people were guaranteed the right to express their views.

The N.W.A.C. , however, were not solely concerned with being recognized as an indigenous people. Rather, they contended that as Aboriginal women they were not given an equal opportunity to express their views. They supported the view that “Group formation is the product of environmental influences, among these environmental factors are political institutions” (Kukathas, ibid). The N.W.A.C. argued that they were placed into a larger group as part of a sweep together of Aboriginal groups. The struggle of the N.W.A.C. was not specific to native people; it was the championship of the feminist cause.

Their cause continued to be a difficult one and on that might have always encountered opposition, because “Laws and systems of polity always begin by recognizing the relations they already find existing between individuals” (J.S.Mill). The government knew that men strove to dominate women, especially in cultures where their existed an established hierarchy. Aboriginal people are a subjugated and disenfranchised group. Women who would want to speak out for their rights within this group would face a great challenge.

The N.W.A.C. as part of the feminist cause, tried to force off the chains of oppression from women, as collective. They claimed that the government had prevented them from achieving this objective. The countered by asserting that the N.W.A.C. was being paranoid. Comparison could be made with Kukathas’ point that the “The National Aboriginal Consultative Committee established by the Australian Commonwealth government were often suspected by their people of succumbing to white patronage, even when they were innocent” (Kukathas, ibid). Favoritism could have been imagined. The government could have contended that the N.W.A.C. erred in contesting their perceived fair distribution of funds to all qualifying representative groups.

The N.W.A.C. argued that they deserved special protection under the law. “According to Kymlicka, cultural communities are entitled to special protection under the law when their integrity is threatened by outside forces…Kymlicka grounds his theory on individual autonomy” (Lever, 2012). The government failed to realize that the N.W.A.C. desired to be recognized not as part of a larger group, but as a separate group. They wanted to be seen as individuals not as a subset of a larger group. The government, however, did not view the N.W.A.C. as a separate group. Instead they perceived them as Aboriginal persons. The N.W.A.C. perceived the governments’ actions to indicate that men and would should be group together, at least as far as where Constitutional issues were concerned.

The N.W.A.C. argued that the government erred in funding exclusively the four Aboriginal groups to which it did supply grants, because they were generally perceived to be male-led groups. The Supreme Court, however, held that the funded groups did not advocate a male-dominated from of self-government. Rather, those groups represented native people collectively. Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dube’ agreed with the decision of the majority, but also held that non-interference guaranteed the fullest functioning of ideas.

The government held that “Indeed race is a family” (Appiah). This might have been the central failure of the government. This, however, might have been a reasonable assumption on its part. How else could a group be viewed, except as a whole? Could it reasonably be argued that colored persons should be classified according to their individual ancestries? This would be illogical as there could not be a set criterion for so determining with certainty the actual origins of each subset for the entire grouping. Or could Semitic peoples or Gypsy’s reasonably be categorized according to their geographical derivations? The N.W.A.C. perceived that the government tended to view indigenous people as a whole and did not distinguish male from female members of the society. The government failed to view indigenous people as a society comprised of distinct ranks of membership constituted by both proud men and women. Where political liberty was concerned the government did not properly allocated rights to all of the aboriginal groups in a legal way.

According to the N.W.A.C. the government had a positive duty to secure their right to freedom of expression. The N.W.A.C., however, was not really arguing about funding. Their argument was not against the contemporary Party in power. Rather, their dispute was with the application of representative democracy in Canada. The failure of the government to maximize the guarantees of liberal democracy was the problem and issue with which the N.W.A.C. was most concerned.

Liberal ideology, however, is not inclined to ‘break up reservation, destroy tribal relations, settle Indians on their homestead, incorporate them into the national life and deal with them not as nations or tribes but as individual citizens, ‘despite the fact that many Indians do not want to be integrated into mainstream society (Kukathas, ibid).

The government argued that it had a negative duty to not interfere or restrict the right to freedom of expression. According to the government, the N.W.A.C. was not prevented from voicing their opinion on the right to aboriginal self-government. The Supreme Court, however, held that the ruling Party did attempt to suppress the N.W.A.C.’s right to freedom of expression with respect the Constitution. But the N.W.A.C. should have realized that they were not restricted from speaking out on this issue. They just were not encouraged to do so or given funding towards that end. The N.W.A.C. argued that the government had discriminated against their group.

Nevertheless, “Individualism ‘combined with the usual stress on personal merit,’ tend to be destructive of minority cultures because the schools argued that the government attempted to deprive them of their individuality. They contended that their right to be recognized as an individual group was guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Charter. Autonomy, not individuality, might have been an underlying issue in this case.

Autonomy might be taken as a given in liberal democracy. But in Canadian history women were traditionally not recognized as equal citizens under the law because of the systemic male dominant culture within Canada. Women were considered things “…women play a central role in the development of men” (Postow, 253). Women’s opinions, however, were not considered to exist. Their views and beliefs were categorized with those of men. According to the feminist perspective women had no purpose except to cater to men and to support them. “Sexism makes no distinction between proper behavior toward women who want sexist roles and those who do not” (Postow, 253).

The subjection of women might have been the root cause of the concerns raised by the N.W.A.C. “The legal subordination of one sex to the other – is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement; and ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality” (Mill, ibid). In this case the burden of proof was on the N.W.A.C., because they argued that government infringed their rights. The N.W.A.C. held that the government infringed their right to freedom of expression and equality under and before the law. They further contended that the Supreme Court allowed their rights to be infringed and paved the way for a precedent. The N.W.A.C. believed this precedent would degrade the importance of their right’s and those of minority women overall. As a result women’s rights might not be properly recognized in a seemingly free and democratic society.

In his book, The Subjection of Women, Mill argued

In every respect the burden is on those who attack an almost universal opinion. They must be very fortunate as well as unusually capable if they obtain a hearing at all. They have more difficulty in obtaining a trial, than any other litigants in getting a verdict. If they do extort a hearing, they are subjected to a set of logical requirements totally different from those exacted from other people. (Mill, 120).

The N.W.A.C. would have agreed that this position demonstrated their plight. For no other reason, than that their case involved too many issues that contrasted with those held by the general and narrow-minded opinion. This might have been why their case had as much difficulty as it did at trial and throughout the judicial process. Even the Supreme Court was clear. The Court did not want to deal with this issue at that time. The majority apologized for being unable to undo the plight of the N.W.A.C. But the specific requirements to prove a violation of Charter rights were not satisfied.

It could be argued that the Court had an obligation to treat the N.W.A.C. as it would any group or person who brought a case before it. In this case the Court failed to recognize that “the law should be no respecter of person, but treat all alike, save where dissimilarity of treatment by positive reasons is required either by justice or polity” (Mill, ibid).  In this case an equality policy would have required that the government fund the N.W.A.C. as it did the other aboriginal groups. The positive enforcement of the guarantee to the right of freedom of expression should have been furthered. The government held that it only had the obligation to not restrict expression, but in this particular case the guarantee of equality before and under the law required positive enforcement of these rights.

This case was not only about the governments’ treatment of the N.W.A.C. Actually it was about the treatment of women in Western society collectively. Women have waited a long time to be recognized as citizens under the law. Women overall have fought a difficult battle. Historically women were not considered to be human by the male dominated society of the Western World.

But Mill argued:

…those who deny to women any freedom or privilege rightly allowed to men, having the double presumption against them that they are opposing and recommending partiality, must be held to the strictest proof of their case, and unless their success be such as to exclude all doubt, the judgment out to go against them. (Mill, 121)

Mill was not alone in his support of women’s rights. He argued that women were subjected to inferior treatment, especially in the political realm. Men as gender were perceived as being sexist. “There is no getting around the fact that the positive self-esteem of men has been centrally tied to their being sexists” (Thomas). In contrast, the Canadian government followed Thomas’s argument that “…men are supposed to protect women and provide them with the comforts of life” (Thomas).

There was another side to this case. The government argued that it could not fund every group that desired representation or assistance to facilitate freedom of expression. If the government funded the N.W.A.C., after having offered the native community as a whole the opportunity to elect their own representatives, than special interests group would surface from all sides asking for funding. Danley argued that “Kymlicka’s liberalism, then, fails to account for the morally significant differences between aboriginal and non-aboriginal cultural minorities” (Danley). Disabled persons and gay and lesbian rights groups could also claim, along with Semitic peoples and other minorities that the government likewise owed them compensation for past injustices. Further, they could have claimed that they needed funding to ensure equal representation in Canada, which is predominantly Catholic and Protestant country.

The government and the N.W.A.C. focused on different political objectives. The government’s case was based mainly on political obligations balanced against the economic actualization of their position. It was not certain that the government could have solved all the injustices affecting Native Peoples or those of women in general or any and all racial or political faction by compensating them.

  Bibliography

Appiah, Anthony. The Uncomplicated Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race. Critical Inquiry, Vol.12, No. 1,
“Race,” Writing and Difference (Atumn 1985) pp. 21-37. Retrieved from:
https://www.msu.edu/~harrow/ucad/Appiah-Uncompleted-Argument.pdf

Edited by Avigail Eisenberg, Jeff Spinner-Halev. Minorities Within Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity.
     England: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Danley, J.R. “Liberalism, Aboriginal Rights and Cultural Minorities” (1991) 20 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 169 at 176.

Edited by Annabelle Lever. New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property. England:
Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Mill, J.S. The Subjection of Women. New York: Dover Publications, 1997.

Thomas, Laurence. Symposium on Sexism and Racism: Some Conceptual Differences. Ethics
90, (January 1980) p. 239-250. University of Chicago.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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